ASHMORE vs. TOWING TRANSPORTATION COMPANY.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of Tew Jersey,
February Term, 1860.
JOSEPH ASHMORE

AND

JEREMIAH

LALOR VS. PENNSYLVANIA

TOWING AND TRANSPORTATION

STEAM

COMPANY.'

1. A person engaged in the business of towing boats is liable for damages arising
from the negligence of his agent, who has charge of the towing vessels, where the
parties have not agreed to the contrary.
2. The agent of a towing company made an agreement with the master of a canal
boat to tow the boat from Bordentown to Schuylkill, and back again, at the risk
of the master and owner, the master agreeing to keep a competent man at the
helm of his boat at all times while the tow was in motion, and guaranteeing that
the boat should be seaworthy and reasonably fit for the trip. Held, that, under
this agreement, if the boat to be towed was seaworthy, the only risks that the
towing company were exempt from were the risks incidental to ordinary careful
navigation, and they were not exempt from liability for damages caused by the
negligence or unskilfulness of their agents or servants: held also, that an action
for tort was the proper remedy, the contract being set out in the declaration as
matter of inducement.
3. The failure of the master and owner of the canal boat to perform the stipulations
of the agreement do not affect the liability of the party towing the boat, unless
such failure to perform contributed to the accident.
4. A common carrier may make a contract limiting or lessening his responsibility,
but ought not to be permitted to make a contract that will exempt him from
liability for damages occasioned by his own or his servants' negligence or misconduct.-Per VAx DYKE, T.
5. Whether persons engaged in towing boats are considered common carriers, and
should be held responsible, as such, for the boat towed and its cargo ?-Query.

This cause came before the court on a motion for a new trial.
The facts, sufficient for a proper understanding of the case, appear
in the opinions delivered.
Argued at June term, 1859, before the Chief Justice, and Justices Yredenburgh, Whelpley, and Van Dyke.
Bradley, for the motion.
Beasley, contra.
We are indebted to the learned Reporter for this case, who has supplied us with
the sheets of his volume now in press. The case will be found in 4 Dutcher's New
Jer. Rep., p. 180.
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WHELPLEY,

J.-This was an action on the case by the plaintiffs,

owners of a canal boat called the Free Trader, against the defendants, proprietors of a steam tug, for negligence in towing the
Free Trader on the Delaware, per quod she was sunk and lost.
If the defendants were liable for the consequences of an accident
caused by the negligence of their agent, I think the verdict was
right. It was in entire accordance with the decided weight of evidence in the case. The boat was lost because of the grounding of
the steamer, and she grounded upon a known bar in the Delaware,
which might have been avoided by the use of ordinary care and
skill.
I do not deem it necessary at this time to decide the vexed question, whether a tower is a common carrier, so as to be subject to
the common law liabilities of a carrier for hire, nor the other question, so elaborately discussed at the bar, whether a common carrier
may by agreement repeal the common law, and substitute a law
made for the particular case.
The policy of permitting parties to change the law at pleasure is,
to my mind, quite questionable. But, be that as it may, it is
extremely clear that a tower is liable for all damages arising directly
and solely from the negligence of his agent having charge of the
towing vessel, where the parties have not agreed to the contrary.
In this case the agents of the respective parties entered into an
agreement in writing, which stated that the agent of the towing
company had agreed to tow the canal boat Free Trader, whereof
Lynch was master, from Bordentown to Schuylkill, and back again,
empty, at the risk of the master and owner of said boat, and subject to the stipulations following : first, the said master expressly
agrees to have a competent man at the helm of his said boat at
all times while the tow is in motion; second, the said master
expressly guarantees that his said boat is seaworthy, and reasonably fit for the trip undertaken.
It is said, on the part of the defendants, that the agreement to
tow the boat at the risk of the master and owner of the boat exempts
the defendants from liability to respond for a loss caused by the
negligence of their agent in command of the towing vessel; that
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such is the literal import of the agreement. An agreement which
is to exempt a party for hire from any responsibility for his own
negligence, ought to be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt.
There is no presumption in favor of such a construction. We
can hardly suppose the owner of a tow would willingly and knowingly enter into an agreement of that import. If the strict literal
import of the first clause of the agreement be adhered to, it would
cover not only the case where a loss occurred through negligence,
but also wilfulness of the owner of the towing boat or his agent.
But we cannot suppose such to have been the actual intent; no
person in his senses would agree that another might wilfully destroy
valuable property, committed to his care, without beingresponsible
therefor.
We must resort to construction to reach the legal import of the
agreement. In doing this, the whole agreement must be examined,
not that stipulation only which contains the words at the risk of the
master and owner of said boat, but all the stipulations.
I think the broad language of the first stipulation must be
limited by the actual intent of the parties, as shown by the agreement as a whole.
What is the object of the stipulations required of the master of
the tow ? The first requires the master to have a competent man
at the helm at all times when the tow is in motion. This may be
said to be a stipulation not intended to guard the tow from danger,
but to render the management of the tow more easy by the tower.
This may be true. The stipulation may have a double object, but
I think it is fairly susceptible of the latter.
But what shall be said of the second stipulation, requiring the
master to guarantee expressly that his boat is seaworthy and reasonably fit for the trip undertaken?
Its only object can be to limit the responsibility incurred by the
taking of the boat to tow. If the boat be seaworthy, and fit for the
trip undertaken, the risk of loss by negligence or accident caused
by that, will be diminished; and to diminish this risk to the smallest
possible amount, the master is required to guarantee expressly the
seaworthiness and fitness of his boat. If the tower is to be exempt
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from liability for negligence of his agent-if he is to be liable in
no event-why require an express guaranty that the boat is seaworthy ?
The whole agreement, taken together, obviously means that the
tower is to be exempt from the risks incidental to ordinary careful
navigation, but not from those caused by his own negligence or 'that
of his agents, if the boat is seaworthy and reasonably fit for the
purposes of the trip.
The case of Wells and Tucker vs. Te Steam Navigation Co.,
4 Selden, 880, is a case in principle like the one now before the
court. There the contract of towage was contained in an order
directing the captain of the tug to take in tow the boat, at the risk
of the master and owners, and collect $25. That was the whole
coitract, and the court held the tower responsible.
In Caton vs. Rumney, 13 Wend. 387; Alexander vs. Green,
3 Hill, 9 ; Wells vs. Steam Navigation Co., 2 Comstock, 204, the
words of the contract were similar to those just mentioned.
The English cases cited on the argument, Austin vs. Manchester,
10 Com. Bench. 453; Carr vs. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railroad Co., 7 Excbeq. 707; Pardngton vs. South Wales Railroad
Co. 1 Hurls. & Nor. 392, were all cases of explicit contracts for
non-liability, where the language of the contract was too plain
to admit of doubt, or even debate. These cases, turning as they do
upon the terms of contracts differing toto ccelo from that under consideration, furnish neither authority or advice towards the settlement of this case.
It is evident that if a tower may limit his responsibility by contract, that each case must be decided mainly upon the particular
contract entered into. The contract in this case was intended to
exempt the tower from all risk incidental to careful navigation, and
the exemption was not to extend to risks caused by want of skill or
care in the tower.
It was contended that the company were not liable for the loss,
because there was not, at the time the accident occurred, a competent man at the helm, according to the first stipulation. If the
failure to perform this stipulation in any way contributed to the
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loss, this would be fatal to the plaintiff's claim; but that question
was left to the jury, and they have decided otherwise, and I think
very properly. If the contract had stipulated that the master
should carry at all times in his cabin extra lines for lashing, or
anything else used about a vessel, as an anchor, the failure to comply with the stipulation would not discharge the tower, unless he
in some way sustained damage by its non-performance. One who
sues another for negligence, cannot recover if he himself has been
guilty of negligence which contributed to produce the result.
Moore vs. The Central Railroad of New Jersey, 4 Zab. 268,
S. 0.824.
If this were an action upon the contract, it would not be incumbent upon the plaintiff to allege or prove performance of this stipulation, for its performance is not made by the contract a condition
precedent to the performance of any agreement to perform the towing with due and proper care. Whether covenants or stipulations
are concurrent or independent, or one is a condition precedent to
the other, must always depend upon the sense and substance of the
contract, not its form merely or the order in which they stand.
Kingston vs. Preston,Doug. 690; Pordage vs. Cole, 1 Saund. 319,
b. 2; Pars.on Con. 40.
A stipulation may be in the nature of a condition precedent to
some of the other stipulations, without being so as to all. If the
Free Trader had presented itself to be towed without any man to
stand at the helm, the tug might have refused to take her in tow;
or if, after she had been taken in tow, her master had refused to
keep a competent man at the helm, the tug might have cast
her off, and refused to tow her any further, or it might waive the
performance of the stipulation altogether. So far the stipulations
might be dependent, but the non-performance of this stipulation by
the master of the tow could not justify a breach of the stipulation
to tow the boat skilfully and carefully. The defendant could not
say, you did not fulfil the stipulation to keep a competent man at
the helm, therefore I navigated my tug carelessly and negligently,
and destroyed your boat.
It was said, on the argument, that the failure to keep a compe-
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tent man at the helm operated as a rescission of the implied stipulation to tow carefully and skilfully. This is but a statement of the
argument just disposed of in another form. It would be so if the
performance of the covenant to tow carefully and skilfully was
dependent on that of the covenant to keep the man at the helm.
There remains but one objection, that the action was improperly
in tort, and not upon the contract. The contract to tow is set out
as inducement, and the legal duty resulting is set forth, and the
tortious breach of the duty is averred. This mode of declaring is
in accordance with the precedents.
The action against a carrier may be either in assumpsit or case:
2 Chit. P1. 357, note 648; Com. Dig., Action on Case C. In all
the books of entries, precedents are given of declarations, both in
assumpsit and case. But if this case does not fall within the law
of carriers, and the declaration is deficient in form, it is amendable.
The case has been tried upon its merits. Neither party has been
surprised by the form of the pleadings; and the line dividing
actions on the case, ex contractu from those ex delicto, is in cases
of this kind so shadowy, that you may pass from one to the other,
oftentimes without being aware of the transition.
The rule to show cause should be dismissed.
VAN DYKE, J. In April, 1857, the defendants, with their steamtug Henlopen, took in tow the plaintiffs' boat or scow, the Free
Trader, loaded with sand, (in connection with thirteen other boats,)
for the purpose of towing the same from Bordentown to Schuylkill
and back, for the sum of $7. The fourteen boats were arranged
and fastened together in three tiers of four abreast, and two abreast
in the rear, the tow-line being some sixty feet in length. Previous to
starting, the parties, through their agents, had signed a written agreement that the voyage was undertaken at the risk of the master and
owner of the boat Free Trader, the captain thereof expressly agreeing, in and by the said writing, "to have a competent man at the
helm of said boat at all times when the tow was in motion." And
he also guaranteed "that the said boat was seaworthy, and reasonably fit for the trip undertaken.
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When nearly opposite Rancocas creek, at about tlv hmm of twelve
or one o'clock in the morning, the steam tug suddenly struck on a
bar, or other obstruction, and became fast; the tow was thrown
into confusion, coming into collision with the steam tug and the
boats with each other; the stem-line of the plaintiffs' boat parted,
or gave way. It swung round on the Pennsylvania side, and in the
general jostle it was injured and sunk, and has not since been
raised. The plaintiffs' boat is not shown to be unseaworthy; but it
is proved and admitted that there was no person at the helm at .the
time of the occurrence, and had not been for some fifteen or *Wu",
minutes, although there were persons on board. The Chief J=Ge
charged the jury, that, if the steamer was out of her course, aad ,id
struck upon a bar in consequence, and if this was oemaoA, bi"
the want of ordinary care and prudence, such as a prudent pqson would take of his own property, the defendants would be haM
for the loss notwithstanding the written agreement aforesaid ,
The jury were further charged, that, if the sinking of the boat
was the inevitable -consequence of the grounding of the steamer,
and if a man at the helm could not have been of any possible service in saving the boat, then his absence from the helm at the moment of the accident could not affect the plaintiffs' right to recover.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the question is,
are they entitled to recover under the circumstances of the
case?
The questions involved in this inquiry have become a little uncertain in modern times. By the common law, common carriers, or
persons whose business it was to carry or transport the goods and
property of other persons from one place to another for hire, were
held to a very rigid accountability, amounting to an absolute insurance, and were only excusable when the loss occurred through
the acts of God and the public enemy. In more recent times, and
especially since the introduction of steam as a means of transportation, there has been a constant effort on the part of carriers to
shake off this responsibility, by means of notices, advertisements,
tickets, special contracts, and the like, while the courts in the meantime, as a general thing, have yielded a very reluctant aid to
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such efforts, in a number of cases, refusing to sustain them at all,
even when there was a special contract. So strictly was the old
law adhered to in England, that Parliament interfered, and passed
several acts, especially that of 17 W. 4, and 1st Victoria, 6, authorizing common carriers to make special contracts with the persons
who employed them, as to how the risks of transportation were to
be borne. I am not aware of the passage of any such act in this
country, but there has been, nevertheless, in some of the States of
the Union, a continued modification of the laws concerning common
carriers, and the whole subject has become so diversified and intermixed with contradictory decisions, that it is not easy to determine
with certainty what the law is in relation to such matters.
The principal defence in this case is, that here was a special contract between the parties, by which the plaintiffs agreed to incur
all the risk of such a loss as occurred; and the first question
which seems to present itself is, can common carriers lawfully make
a special contract changing their liability from that which was imposed on them by the common law? I can see no reason why they
may not, under proper circumstances,,make contracts with their
employees not contrary to public policy, by which their liability may
be regulated, lessened, or limited. The reasons why common carriers were held to such a stringent accountability, doubtless were
not merely because they carried for hire, but because they usually
took the exclusive custody and control of the articles carried to the
exclusion of the owner, and because the toleration of any excuse,
except for such loss as no human effort could, by possibility, prevent, might lead to collusion with others to deprive the owner of his
property, and at the same time exempt the carrier from responsibility ; but just to the extent to which the owner retains the custody of or control over the property carried, be ought to be responsible, and the carrier ought to be exempt, and there can be no
reason why there should not be a special agreement on that subject;
and although there has been considerable discussion on the question, whether any contract could lawfully be made limiting the
liability of a common carrier, yet the question seems to be now fully
settled that such contracts can be lawfully made, and I shall assume
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such to be the law, without reference to any of the numerous authorities by which it is sustained.
But a much more important, as well as much more difficult question, is the extent to which a common carrier may, by a special contract, exempt himself from liability. This question has given rise
to much discussion, to various dicta, and a number of decisions,
upon the whole not very harmonious, so far from being so in fact
as to leave the law on the subject far from being settled. Under
the English statutes authorizing special contracts, the English courts,
in 70 Com. Law Rep. 454, 7 Excheq. 707, and 89 Com. Law, 621,
go very far towards sustaining a carrier in exempting himself by
contract from all losses arising from what could be termed negligence ; but the contracts in those cases were very comprehensive,
very circumstantial, very explicit, and related to the carrying of
live stock on railways, and the decisions turned much more on the
meaning of the contracts on the points under particular consideration than in the enunciation of any new principle.
In 3 Hill, 1, it was held that a tow boat was not a common carrier, and that under a special contract placing the risk on the
plaintiffs, the owners of the tow boat were not responsible for the
sinking of the tow, even though it occurred from want of ordinary
care on their part; but this decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals, in 7 Hill, 583, by a vote of 17 to 1.
In 2 Comstock, 204, the Supreme Court had held that a steam
tug or tow boat was a common carrier, and liable as such, and
could not exempt itself from such liability by a contract that the
plaintiff was to take the risk. The Court of Appeals reversed this
decision, and held that the defendants could make a contract for
exemption, and ordered a new trial.
In 4 Selden, 375, the Court of Appeals held the defendants
liable for gross negligence, notwithstanding a special contract placing the risk upon the plaintiff.
In 1 Smith, 444, the court held a railroad company liable for
gross negligence, or want of skill, for injury done to a passenger,
although the passenger paid no fare, amd was riding under a special agreement that the company was to be exempt from all liability.
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And in 26 Barbour, 641, the court held that a railroad company
would not be liable under such circumstances, except for fraud or
gross misconduct or negligence, which seems very much like the
same thing.
In 23 Penn.. 526, the court held that public carriers cannot
exempt themselves from gross negligence, even by contract.
In 6 Indiana Rep. 416, the court held tow boats responsible for
gross negligence, such as going too fast, even when under a special
contract that the risk is to be with the owner of the tow.
In 1 American Railway Cases, 171, the Supreme Oourt of Maine
holds that an express agreement exempting the company from all
loss cannot protect it against its own negligence or misconduct. In
2 American Railroad Cases, 357, the same doctrine is announced,
and in another case in the same volume, p. 399, it is held that notice
that all baggage is at the risk of the owners, though brought home
to the plaintiff, cannot excuse the company.
The subject, in different forms, has been at different times before
the Supreme Court of the United States. The case bearing most
directly on the point now under consideration was one which attracted considerable attention at the time, in consequence of the
very serious disaster out of which it proceeded, the burning of the
Lexington on Long Island Sound in January, 1840. It was very
elaborately argued, and very ably examined and discussed by different members of the court, in announcing their decision. It is
found reported in 6 Howard, 344. The suit was brought to recover for specie alleged to have been lost with the loss of the boat.
The principal defence was that the specie was carried under a special contract between the parties, which in its terms exempted the
defendants from all loss whatever. Harnden, well known as an
express man, had a contract with the company, by which, in consideration of $250 per month, they agreed to carry for him, on
board their steamers, a wooden crate of certain dimensions, contents unknown, once on each day, between New York and Providence, and it was expressly stipulated that " the said crate, with
its contents, is to be at all times exclusively at the risk of the
said Win. F. Harnden; and the New Jersey Steam Navigation
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Company (the defendant) will not in any event be responsible,
either to him or his employers, for the loss of any goods, wares,
merchandise, money, notes, bills, evidences of debt, or property of
any and every description, to be conveyed or transported by him
in said crate or otherwise in any manner in the boats of the said
company." Into the crate thus bargained for, the specie in question was placed by Harnden, and the crate and its contents seem to
have been at all times under the control of him or his agents, except
that the company transported it from one place to the other in
their boats, without even a knowledge of its contents. Notwithstanding this very express agreement, which was in due form reduced to writing, the court held the defendants liable for the loss,
on the ground of negligence and want of due caution and care.
While, therefore, it seems to be very well established that special contracts may be made between the parties, the great weight of
authority seems to be, that carriers cannot be permitted to make
contracts by which to shelter and protect themselves in courts of
law against their own clear and palpable wrongs, either of omission or of commission. They may contract for exemption against
such accidents as common prudence could not foresee or guard
against, and when no actual fault can be ascribed to them; but it
has been repeatedly held contrary to public policy to sustain a contract by which a carrier might be tempted into dishonesty or a relaxation of his faithfulness and duty. It seems to be conceded
that he cannot contract against his own fraud ; but fraud is but one
of the forms of wrong of which a carrier may be guilty, and
against which he cannot lawfully contract; but it is no more repugnant to the law than any other mode by which the owner of
property, confiding it to the care and custody of others to be carried, is cheated, swindled, or otherwise deprived of it by the clear
wrong, fault, or misconduct of the carrier, and it matters but little
to the owner whether the loss occurs by the .one mode or the other.
Gross negligence is held to be presumptive evidence of fraud, and
the omission to exercise proper skill, when skill is presumed and
required, is considered gross negligence: 1 H. Black. 158.
The rule to be drawn from the great preponderance of authority,
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the one which is demanded by public policy, and which is sustained
by correct legal principle, is this, that a carrier, taking the exclusive custody and control of the property of another to transport
from one place to another for hire, should be allowed to make no
contract by which he can justify himself in or defend himself against
his own clear positive wrong, default, or misconduct, whether it
arise from his own wilfulness, recklessness, incapacity, want of skill,
or the failure to exact it. If the loss arise in part or in whole
from the conduct of the owner, this is always a defence, and always
has been, whether there is a special contract or not ; but if it in
fact arise from the failure to exercise an ordinary and reasonable
amount of care or skill, and the exercise of which, by the carrier,
would have prevented the loss, it should fall upon him, and no contract should protect him against it.
It is the more necessary, perhaps, that the law should be so at a
time when the carrying business has become so greatly concentrated
in the hands of heavy capitalists and powerful companies as to drive
off almost all other competitors, and to compel the owners of property to submit unconditionally to the terms of transportation
which they impose, or leave their goods uncarried.
But it is urged, in this case, that the defendants are not common
carriers, and not subject to the liabilities incident to that class of
persons. I am aware of some conflicting decisions on this question,
but they seem to me to be all mere arbitary decisions, without
having any reasons given for them on the one side or the other.
The defendants certainly call themselves a transportation company. They hold themselves out to the public as such, and daily
pursue that business for hire; and if they carry goods or property
on board their boats, as well as at the stern, they are certainly, to
that extent at least, common carriers. Steamboats carrying property from one place to another for hire are certainly common carriers, if that is their business. And if the defendants in this case
are not, aside from their contract, to be held responsible by the
laws which apply to common carriers, it is because they did not take
the exclusive possession or control of the plaintiffs' property, but
that some part of the custody and control of the boat in tow re-
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mained with the plaintiffs or their agents. Aside from this consideration, I can see no reason why the defendants are not common
carriers, nor do I think it at all necessary to decide the question
whether they are or not. It is much more important to ascertain
precisely what the responsibilities are which they assumed, than it is
to ascertain the name by which we shall call them.
How far, then, had the defendants the absolute control and
management of the plaintiffs' boat, to their exclusion ? If the sand
boat had been carried on the deck of the steamer, the control and
management of it by the defendants would have been absolute. If
it had been lashed firmly to the steamer's side by the defendants,
as in their opinion the best mode of conveyance, so that one or
more hands on board of her could have had no power to guide or
change or restrain her, or in any way to alter her position, the custody and control of the defendants would have been equally absolute. If the defendants placed her in company with fourteen other
boats, and so fastened them together, in tiers or otherwise, as that
persons on board her could have had no power to guide or change
or restrain her, or in any way to change her position, but she depended entirely on the steamer for her course and direction, she
was, to all intents and purposes, in the absolute control and management of the defendants, notwithstanding the tow was placed at the
stern of the steam tug, and notwithstanding a nominal helmsman
was to be kept aboard the sunken boat. This last position is the
one in which it seems to me she was placed, and so placed by the
defendants; and I do not see how it could have been supposed by
the parties, that the helmsman was to take any independent action
in guiding or governing the boat, except to obey an order from the
steamer, which should apply to all the boats alike; and this could
only be as an agent of the defendants, rather than an independent
action in behalf of the plaintiffs.
If, indeed, there had been but a single boat with a long tow line,
so that the helmsman could have kept her in the track of the
steamer, or have guided her to the right or to the left of her, the
case might have been wholly different. But the plaintiffs, in such
case, might have been wholly in fault; but such was not the fact.
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I think, therefore, that the defendants were public carriers or
transporters for hire. I think that, for a price fixed by themselves,
they undertook to transport the plaintiffs' boat and cargo from Bordentown to Schuylkill; that for that purpose they took the entire
custody, control, and management of her, and must be responsible
for her loss, unless they have some exemption by which they are to
be freed from it. They claim such exemption. They insist that,
by the terms of the contract before referred to, the plaintiffs were to
take the risk of such losses as this ; and this raises the question, by
whose fault or misconduct did the loss occur ? If it was the fault
of the plaintiffs, then the defendants are not liable. If it was the
fault or misconduct of the defendants or their agents, then they are
liable. There can be no supposition that the occurrence would have
happened if the steamer had not struck. Whose fault was it that
she did strike ? Certainly it could not have been the plaintiffs';
it must have been the defendants'. Fault or great negligence there
must have been. It was a case where skill was presumed and
required, and if unskilful or incompetent persons were put in charge
of the steamer, it was gross wrong and gross negligence, amounting
to a fraud upon the owners of the property. If the necessary skill
existed, and was not exercised when the exercise of it would have
prevented the loss, it was also gross negligence and gross wrong;
nor is it possible to doubt that if the necessary skill had been present, and had been properly-exercised and exerted, the accident
would not have occurred. There was nothing in the wind nor the
weather, nor the water, nor in any thing else, to overcome ordinary
care and skill, if they had been exerted on the part of the defendants ;
and whether we call it fraud or misconduct, or slight negligence or
gross negligence, the loss arose from the clear and unquestionable
fault of the defendants ; and against such faults no contract, however
explicit or however drawn, should be permitted to protect them.
But what is the true purport and effect of the contract before us?
The defendants agreed to tow the plaintiffs' boat and cargo from
Bordentown to Schuylkill, at the risk of the owners. What risks
could the parties have contemplated when entering into this contract ? Did the plaintiffs mean to say, by that contract, that if
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their captain, through oppressive drowsiness, should happen to get
asleep, and the pilot, from inability to resist temptation, should
unfortunately get drunk, and run the tow upon the rocks, the risk
is ours, and we are to sustain the loss ? Did the defendants so understand it ? And if the accident had occurred in that way, would or
could this contract have sheltered the defendants ? I can hardly
think so ; and yet I am somewhat at a loss to see why it would not, if
the defendants' construction of the contract is the right one, for I
am unable to see much legal difference between a vessel run upon
the rocks by officers drunk and asleep, and the same thing done,
without any cause for it, by officers sober and awake.
But it seems to me that the contract itself, taken altogether,
clearly shows that the parties, at the time of making it, could not,
either of them, have contemplated the construction now contended
for ; for if the plaintiffs were to take all the risks, and the defendants none, why were the plaintiffs required to stipulate that the
boat was seaworthy ? If the plaintiffs were to take all the risks,
and the defendants none, why were the plaintiffs required to stipulate to keep a person at the helm at all times when the tow was in
motion ? These are agreements for the benefit of the defendants,
and were required by them as aids in enabling them to make a safe
voyage. But why should the defendants have hedged themselves
about with such securities against loss, if they were not to be liable
under any circumstances? And why were the plaintiffs called upon
by the defendants to enter into such stipulations, if they were only
intended for their own security, and not at all for the benefit of the
defendants? And on what principle is it that the company is now
defending themselves on the ground that the stipulation to keep a
person at the helm was violated, unless that stipulation was made
for their benefit ?
I think, therefore, that the contract was a proper and legal one,
rightly understood. That it was intended to exempt the company
from a class or set of accidents, for which they would be liable as
common carriers, but are such as ordinary care and prudence cannot
foresee nor prevent, but was never intended to permit them to take advantage of orjustify their own wrong, or to shelter them against their
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own frauds, faults, misconduct, incapacity, or clear negligence or
carelessness of any kind-for all these they still remained responsible; and to meet this responsibility with as little difficulty and risk
as possible, they required the plaintiffs to stipulate something on
their part-and if they have failed to comply with these stipulations, by reason of which the loss occurred, they cannot now recover.
The plaintiffs stipulated that their boat was seaworthy, and I do
not find any evidence that shows that it was not; on the contrary,
the evidence shows that she was.
They also stipulated to keep a competent man at the helm at all
times while the tow was in motion. This they certainly did not do
"at all times," for there was no one at the helm at the moment of
the accident, and had not been for some fifteen or twenty minutes;
and if the construction of the words, at all times, is to be so strict as
to mean that any absence from the helm while the tow was in
motion, amount to a violation of such stipulation, then there can be
no recovery here. But I cannot suppose this; I cannot suppose
that it extends to every absence at any time during the voyage, but
to such absence as occasioned or contributed to the disaster; and if
I could see how a person at the helm at the time the steamer struck,
could by possibility have prevented the loss, I should hold the plaintiffs responsible" for it; but I cannot so see. What could he have
done ? It does not appear that he was at liberty to undertake to
steer his single boat alone, or do anything else without orders from
the steamer; and it seems very clear that he could not have done so
if he had made the effort. 1o orders came from the steamer for
him to obey; the men on the tow were not aware that she had
struck till they felt the collision. He could not have prevented the
parting of the stern line, nor the collision of the boats, nor their
swinging around the steamer. All the use he could have made of
the helm, had he been at it all the while, would have been to steer,
or attempt to steer, the boat. This, it seems to me, must have been
perfectly futile. But this question was submitted to the jury by
the Chief Justice, in a charge which the defendants have no reason
to complain of. They have found under that charge, and under
the evidence, that the loss of the plaintiffs' boat was the inevitable
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result of the striking or grounding of the steamer, and that nothing
which could have been done by a man at the helm could possibly
have prevented it.
I think, therefore, that the charge of the Chief Justice, as to the
law of the case, was correct, and I can find nothing in the facts to
justify the setting aside of this verdict.
GREEN, C. J.,

concurred.
dissented

VREDENBURGH, J.,

In tlze Massachusetts Court, January Term, 1861.
FRANCIS LE BRETON AND ANOTHER vs. HENRY A. PEIRCE.'
If the owners of property have intrusted it to an agent for a special purpose, and
the agent, in violation of his duty, has unlawfully consigned the same to be sold,
with directions to remit the proceeds to a private creditor of his own, and such
creditor, upon being informed by a letter from the consignee of the consignment
of the property and directions in reference to the same, manifests his assent
thereto by unequivocal acts, and the property is sold by the consignee, and bills
of exchange, payable to the agent's creditor or his order, are purchased with the
proceeds, and remitted in a letter addressed to him, in compliance with the
directions, and the creditor, after receiving notice of the intended remittance,
and after manifesting his assent thereto, and after the remittance is actually
made, but before it is received, learns for the first time of the manner in which
the agent became possessed of the property, and of his wrongful acts in reference to it, the original owners of the property cannot mainutai an action for
money had and received against such creditor, to recover the amount collected
by him upon the bills of exchange.

Contract for money had and received. At the trial in this
Court, the following facts were agreed:
In August, 1858, the defendant sold to John H. Delee the bark
"Messenger Bird" for 516,000, receiving one-half in cash, and
Delee's note for 58,000, payable in six months, with interest,
secured by a mortgage of the vessel. The defendant at the same
time took as further security policies of insurance on the vessel to
the amount of $16,000, payable to him in case of loss, for a voyage
I This interesting case will appear in 2 Allen's Mass. Rep. p. 8, and we thank
both the learned Judge, who delivered the opinion, and the reporter, for the advance
sheets kindly furnished us.-EDs. Am. L. lEG.
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stated by Delee to be contemplated by him, at and from a port of
lading north of Cape Hatteras to Rio Janeiro, and back to a port
of discharge north of Cape Hatteras.
On the 2d of May, 1859, the defendant received from Cross &
Co., merchants of Valparaiso, a letter dated March 31, 1859, advising him that the vessel had put into Valparaiso on her voyage
to San Francisco, and discharged a portion of her cargo, 601 bags
of coffee, which had been consigned to them by Delee, with directions to sell the same and remit the proceeds to the defendant,
after deducting their advances to him of $4,292. Upon receiving
this letter, the defendant at once, upon the same day, cancelled his
former policies and made an oral agreement for a reduced insurance
for a voyage of the vessel at and from Valparaiso to San Francisco; which agreement was afterwards discharged by the parties,
upon the development of the facts hereafter stated.
On the 5th of May, 1859, the defendant, who, until then was
wholly ignorant of the proceedings of Delee, and of the fact that
he was not the owner of the coffee consigned by him to Cross &
Co., saw in the "Boston Daily Advertiser" an article as follows:"Bark 'Messenger Bird,' of Kingston, Mass., John H. Delee,
master, which sailed from Rio de Janeiro on the 19th of January
last, with a cargo of 4,824 bags of coffee, for Hampton Roads, for
orders, consigned to Mr. John Gallop, of New York, arrived at
Valparaiso on the 27th of March, ostensibly bound to California.
The cargo, worth $90,000, is insured in England. She had been
supposed to be lost, and the strange conduct of the captain in taking her to Valparaiso is yet to be explained." On the same day,
the defendant wrote to Gallop, inquiring as to the truth of the
facts stated in the article, and stating his own position as to security, and the notice received by him from Cross & Co. Gallop, in
reply, on the next day, gave the information sought, and notified
the defendant that the remittance would be claimed, when received,
as the proceeds of the property of the plaintiffs which had been
barratrously seized and appropriated by Delee.
By letter dated Valparaiso, April 30, 1859, Cross & Co. remitted to the defendant, in bills of exchange, payable to him or his
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order, $5,084 84, being the net proceeds of the sales of the 601
bags of coffee above referred to, after deducting their advances.
This letter was received June 14, 1859, and Gallop was informed
thereof; and he, acting as agent of the plaintiffs and in their behalf, requested payment of the bills of exchange, with which request
the defendant declined to comply. The bills were paid to the
defendant before this action was brought.
In January, 1859, the plaintiffs, merchants of Rio Janeiro,
owned and shipped on board of the "Messenger Bird," owned and
commanded by Delee, 4,824 bags of coffee, to be carried to Hampton Roads, and thence to New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore,
according to orders to be received from Gallop, to whom the same
were consigned as agent of the plaintiffs, for sale on their account.
The vessel sailed ostensibly on this voyage; but, instead of pursuing the same, Delee barratrously took her round Cape Horn, and
put into Yalparaiso in the latter part of March, where he landed
the 601 bags of coffee, assumed ownership of the same, and fraudulently consigned them to Cross & Co. for sale, and obtained an
advance thereon of $4,292, and sailed with the vessel and the residue of the cargo, apparently for San Francisco; and the vessel and
the residue of the cargo have since been lost, or are in possession
of Delee, or have been fraudulently disposed of by him. No communication has been received by the defendant from Delee since
the vessel sailed from the United States, nor has he received any
payment for his debt, except as above stated.
T1. C. Loring, for the plaintiffs, cited Moses vs. .aeferlan,
2 Burr. 1,008; Taylor vs. Plumer, 3 M. & S. 562; Hudson vs.
Robinson, 4 M. & S. 478; Neat vs. Harding, 4 Eng. Law & Eq.
494 ;-fason vs. Waite, 17 Mass. 560; Hall vs. Jfarston,Ib. 579;
Gilmore vs. Wilbur, 12 Pick. 124; 2 Story on Eq. §§ 1,255, 1,256,
1,258; Oliver vs. .Piatt,3 How. (U. S.) 401; Wilson vs. General
Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 860.
S. Bartlett & D. Thaxter, for the defendant, cited Lime Book
Bank vs. .Plimpton,17 Pick. 159; Smith vs. Hodson, 4 T. R. 211;
S. C. 2 Smith's Lead. Cases, 81, 89; Story oii Agency, § 229;
Blanchardvs. Stevens, 3 Cush. 162; Swift vs. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1;
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lMiller vs. Race, 1 Burr. 452; Olarke vs. Shee, Cowp. 197; Calland vs. Loyd, 6 M. & W. 26; Mason vs. Waite, 17 Mass. 560;
Atlantic Bank vs. Mferchants' Bank, 10 Gray; 2 Kent. Com.
(6th ed.) 623 ; Story on Notes, § 195, note; Peters vs. Ballistier,
3 Pick. 505; Hunter vs. Prinsep, 10 East. 378.
The Opinion of the Court was delivered by
MERRICIC, J. ,The sale of the coffee by Cross & Co., by the
direction of Delee, under the circumstances mentioned in the
statement of facts, did not divest the plaintiffs of their right of
property therein. If found within their reach, they would still
have been entitled to reclaim and take possession of it as their
own. They might also, if they had elected to do so, have
waived the tort, and maintained an action against the- vendors
for the money for which it was sold. But this would have been
an affirmation of the contract of sale, which they would have
been obliged to pursue through all its consequences. They
could not recover against the wrongdoers the actual value of the
property, as they might have done in an action of trover or
trespass, but would be limited to the amount for which it was
sold. Treating him merely as their debtor, responsible to them
in that relation for a definite sum, without regard to the identity
of the money which he had received upon conversion of the
property, they would recover judgment against him for the same
amount, and the proceeds of the sale would thereby be left in his
hands as his own: Jones vs. Hoar, 5 Pick. 285; Smith vs.
HUodson, 4 T. R. 211, and note to same case in 2 Smith's Lead.
Cas. 81.
But the plaintiffs, not now seeking to avail themselves of their
right to waive the tort and affirm the contract of sale, attempt to
maintain their action upon a different, though somewhat similar
principle of law. The claim that the coffee was intrusted by them
to Delee, at Rio Janeiro, for the specific purpose of being carried
in the bark "1Messenger Bird" to Hampton Roads, and thence to
New York, Philadelphia or Baltimore, according to the directions
of John Gallop, to whom it was consigned; that Delee barratrously departed from the proposed voyage, and, having arrived
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at Yalparaiso, there, in violation of his contract and of his duty,
consigned the coffee to Cross & Co. with instructions to make sale
of the same, and, after deducting their advances, to remit the
balance of the proceeds to the defendant; and that the money
received by the defendant upon the bills of exchange remitted to
him in pursuance of those instructions, is a mere substitute for the
coffee, and only a new form into which it had been converted by
an unlawful sale.
It is clear that the abuse of a trust can confer no right eithek on
the party guilty of such misconduct or on those who claim in
privity with him. Property covered by a trust may always be
reclaimed, wherever it may be found; and no change of its form,
state or condition, can relieve it from, or divest it of, the trust, or
give to the agent or trustee by whom it is converted, or those who
represent him in right, whether as executors, administrators,
assigns or purchasers, with notice and without consideration, any
more valid claim in respect to it than they severally had before
the change took place. It is of no consequence into what form
different from the original the change may have wrought itwhether it be that of goods, chattels, notes, stock or coin; for the
product, as a substitute for the original thing, still follows the
nature of the thing itself, so long as it can be ascertained to be
such. These are the terms in which the law is laid down by Lora
Ellenborough, as affirmed by the court in the carefully considered
case of Taylor vs. Plumer, 3 M. & S. 562. And Judge Story,
who borrows his language, after declaring that the principle has
universality of application in equity, adds, that it is fully recognized at law in all cases where it is susceptible of being brought
out as a ground of action or defence in a suit at law: 2 Story on
Eq. § 1,258.
But the right of parties to avail themselves of the benefit of this
principle is subject to two qualifications, th .one arising from necessity, and the other from general considerations of equity and
justice. In the first place, the right of pursuing the original property through all successive modifications and changes unavoidably
fails when the means of establishing the identity of that which is
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claimed with that which was covered with the trust cannot be produced, or do not in fact exist. This will occur when the subject
matter is first turned into money, and that is afterwards mixed
and confounded in a general mass of property of the same description. This is only an instance in illustration of the rule which
must of necessity be applied in every case where it has become impossible to establish the fact of the alleged identity: The second
qualification of the same principle arises, and precludes the owner
of the property covered by the trust from the further pursuit of it,
when, having been tortiously converted into a new form-as, for
example, merchandisQ into promissory notes, or money into public
stocks-it has in the latter form and condition been sold and
transferred to a purchaser for a valuable consideration and without
notice of any existing equities. In either of these contingencies,
the owner of property misapplied can only obtain redress by finding and repossessing himself of the specific thing of which he has
been deprived, or by a personal action against those who unjustly
or unlawfully have converted it to their own use. It is certainly
reasonable that losses resulting from the unfaithfulness of an
agent should be borne by the principal whose misplaced confidence
has afforded the means of producing it, rather than by strangers
acting fairly in the ordinary course of business: 2 Story on Eq.,
ubi supra.
If, therefore, Cross & Co., upon a sale of coffee consigned to
them by Delee, had received payment for it in money, and had
mixed and united that with their other moneys, and had afterwards, out of their general and common fund, purchased and remitted bills of exchange for a corresponding amount, according to the
directions of the consignor, which we suppose is the usual manner
in which commission merchants conduct their afftairs, the identity
of the original property wvith the money paid by the acceptor of
the bills of exchange, on presentment when due, could not have
been established, and no action for the amount thus received could
have been maintained by the plaintiffs against the holder. But in
this case the parties have agreed that the bills of exchange sent to
the defendant were purchased with the proceeds of the coffee con-
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signed by Delee; that is, as we must understand their agreement,
with the very moneys which Cross & Co. received in payment
upon its sale; just as in the case of Taylor vs. 1Plumer, above
cited, the American stocks, which were the subject in controversy,
were paid for in the same bills which the broker received under
special directions to apply them to the purchase of bills of exchequer. The identity, therefore, of the money received by the
defendant with the coffee belonging to the plaintiffs, and unlawfully disposed of through the tortious and barratrous conduct of
Delee, is by the admission and agreement of the defendant fully
established; and he can, consequently, make an effectual defence
to the present action only by showing that he was a purchaser of
the bills of exchange for a valuable consideration, and without
notice of the fraud practised upon the plaintiffs, or of any existing
equity in their favor.
The taking of a promissory note, bill of exchange or other property, in payment and satisfaction of a preexisting debt, or as collateral security for its payment, constitutes a purchaser for valuable
consideration. This has been definitively determined to be the
law of this Commonwealth. In the case of Blanchard vs. Stevens,
3 Cush. 162, it appeared, from the facts stated in the report, that
P. and B. S. Hale, the makers of the note declared on, procured
it to be indorsed by Stevens, and then, being indebted to the plaintiff, transferred it to him as security for the payment of their debt.
Stevens contended, and offered evidence to prove, that his endorsement of the note was merely for the accommodation of the makers,
and was made upon their representations that the note was to be
used for the purpose of raising money to pay for wheat to be purchased by them in the Western States. The Court said, that the
real question presented for their consideration was, whether the
plaintiff, having received the note either in payment of, or as collateral security for, a precedent debt, must take it subject to all
existing equities between the original parties; and it was held, upon
a full review by DEwEY, J., of all the authorities bearing upon the
question, that the defendant could not avail himself of such equity,
it being unknown to the plaintiffs when they took the note, but
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that they were entitled to recover and hold its contents as absolute
owners.
It is here agreed by the parties, that at the time of the several
transactions out of which the controvery between them arises,
Delee was indebted to the defendant in the sum of $8,000, being
the balance due from him upon the purchase of the bark Messenger
Bird; and that no part of that balance has ever been paid, otherwise than as it is affected by the remittance by Cross & Co. of the
bills of exchange to the defendant, and his receipt of the money
due thereon ; and that until the 5th of May, 1859, he had no knowledge whatever of the tortious and barratrous acts of Delee in
disposing of the coffee belonging to the plaintiffs. His suspicions
were for the first time excited by an article which he saw in the
Boston Daily Advertiser of that date; and on the day following,
upon his own application therefor, he obtained full information
from Mr. Gallop, the plaintiffs' agent, who at the same time gave
notice that the money, when collected on the bills, would be claimed
as the proceeds of their coffee. If, therefore, the bills had before
the 5th of May been transferred to the defendant by his agent,
so that the title thereto vested in him, to be held either in payment, or as collateral security for the payment, of the debt due
to him from Delee, he is entitled to the money which he subsequently received upon them, and this action cannot be maintained.
And of this, upon the facts agreed, we think there can be no reasonable doubt.
When Cross & Co. remitted the bills to the defendant, they certainly intended to make them his property, and did everything in
their power to give that effect to the transaction. The rem'ittance
was in pursuance of the express directions of their consignor, and
was in discharge of their obligations and in payment of their debt to
him; they believing him to have been the true owner of the coffee
consigned to them. The bills were made payable to the order of
the defendant, and forwarded in a letter addressed directly to him.
They were therefore contracts in his name, and in their terms expressly with him; and he only in his own name could maintain a
suit upon or enforce the payment of them. As soon as the letter
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containing them was despatched, the defendant was the only person
who could lawfully demand and receive it from the public carriers,
on its arrival at the place of the defendant's residence, to which it
was directed. There was no right of stoppage in transitu, as in
the case of merchandise; and therefore Cross & Co. ceased to have
any control over either the letter or its enclosures, while the
defendant was entitled to come into the immediate possession of
both. The remittance was made from Valparaiso on the 30th of
April, 1859. On the 2d day of May following, the defendant
received advices of the intended remittance.
It is contended in his behalf, that the remittance being for his
benefit, it is to be presumed as matter of law that he assented to
receive and accept it for the purpose for which it was sent.
Undoubtedly, under the circumstances in which he was placed, he
would be very likely to do so. Delee owed him a large sum of
money, for which the bark, then in a distant sea, and the policies
of insurance upon it, afforded him only an imperfect and uncertain
security. He would therefore naturally avail himself, without hesitation, of any direct offer of payment of his debt, or of any considerable part of it. But without placing too much stress upon this
consideration, or assuming that the law affords the presumption
upon which he insists, we think that his assent to take the bills of
exchange, which at the very time of his action were in course of
transmission, is an inevitable implication from his acts and conduct
in relation to them. Immediately upon receiving from Cross & Co.,
on the 2d of May, intelligence of the intended remittance, and before the article in the Daily Advertiser, above referred to, had been
published, he cancelled his former insurance, and thereupon made
a verbal agreement for a "reduced insurance" on the bark for a
voyage "at and from Yalparaiso to San Francisco." This provision for a "reduced insurance" is very significant, and seems conclusively to show his real purpose, design and action, in reference to
the bills of exchange. It shows that he then understood that, by
means of them, he had acquired new rights, and that he assented to
their transfer to him and adopted them, either as an additional and
acceptable security for the debt due from Delee, or as an actual
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payment, pro tanto, of it. For in whatever light it is considered,
or whichever of these two purposes he may be supposed to have had
in view, it is apparent that he acted upon the assumption that, in
consequence of taking the bills to himself, he had no longer occasion for insurance to the larger amount expressed in the original
policies, because the amount of his debt was reduced, or otherwise
satisfactorily protected. This manifests his intent as clearly as
if he had declared it in the most direct and explicit terms.
When, therefore, it is found that the bills of exchange are contracts made in his name and for his benefit, that upon their transmission they ceased to be subject to the control of any other party;
that as soon as he was advised that they were to be forwarded,
he assented to receive them for the purpose for which they were
remitted, and that he ever afterwards claimed to hold them and
their proceeds as his own, in payment of the debt due to him
from Delee, he can be considered in no other light than as a
purchaser for a valuable consideration. And as the transfer was
thus perfected, and the property became vested in him before he
received notice of the right or claim of the plaintiffs, the defendant is entitled to hold them divested of all existing equities in favor
of other parties.
It has been urged for the plaintiffs, that the condition of the
defendant was in no respect changed, either by the cancelling of
the original policy or by his acceptance of the bills of exchange in
payment of the debt of Delee, because the policies had been already
vacated by the deviation of the bark on the voyage insured, or else
were cancelled under a mistake of fact, and therefore were in that
way invalidated ; and because, upon the recovery by the plaintiffs
in this action, the debt against Delee will revive. But, it is after
all a mere assumption of the fact to assert that these circumstances
effected no change in the defendant's condition. As to the policies,
before he could recover upon them for any loss which may have
occurred, he would certainly now have to prove the alleged mistake
of fact, a burden which, if no cancellation had taken place, would
not have rested upon him; and it is not proved, nor is it, indeed,
now susceptible of proof, that he could and would have done nothing
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in referenoe to his debt, if, upon obtaining information that the
bark upon which he held a mortgage had been carried to Valparaiso, be had not assented to take the offered remittance. No one
can affirm that he would not have attempted to obtain security from
other sources, if he had not placed reliance upon that; and his forbearance from all effort to protect his interest was in itself a change
from the condition in which he then stood, and to which, being
passed, be can of course never be restored.
The court being upon the agreed facts of opinion, for the reasons
stated, that this action cannot be maintained, judgment is to be
entered for the defendants.

In the Carroll Common Pleas of Indiana.
BARNS vs. ALLEN ET AL.
1. Under the Indiana statute of Distributions, the word "natural" is to be understood and interpreted as meaning legitimate.
2. Under that statute the adoption of an heir confers upon him the right of inheritance in the same manner as if he were a legitimate heir.
3. Where a wife has received from her husband, during his life-time, certain real
estate not in lieu of a provision by will or of dower, but absolutely, such gift is
not to be regarded in the light of an advancement either at the common law or
under the Indiana statute.

Application for partition.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
PrmriNs, J.2-The facts of the case re these: Hiram Allen,
Esq., of Carroll county, Indiana, departed this life on the 17th
day of June, 1859, leaving a large estate, consisting of real and
personal property, and a widow, Margaret M. Allen, who had
The act of February 10th, 1853, (1 R. S. Ed. 1861, page 293, note,) provides
"That the real and personal estate of any man (lying intestate, without heirs rcs-

dent in any of the United States, or legitimate children without the tlnited States,
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been his third wife, and had not borne him a child. He also left
one illegitimate son, Hiram Allen, Jr., and one adopted son, William Allen, and an adopted daughter, Kate Allen.
lie left no legitimate children, or descendents of such. He had
disposed of his property, by will, as follows:
"2. As to what property I may die possessed of, I direct that it
shall be disposed of thus: My funeral expenses and all my just
debts must be paid out of my personal estate, provided it be sufficient for that purpose ; and, to enable my executor to pay said
debts, I direct that he sell at public sale all my personal property,
except such as he shall think best to sell at private sale. I hereby
authorize him to sell, and the proceeds of such sales of personal
property, together with all the debts due me which he can collect,
shall be applied to payment of my debts, which I think will be
fully sufficient to pay the same; but if it should not, then I direct
my executor to sell my mill property at Lockport. After all my
debts are fully paid, then I direct that my said executor sell my
said mill property at Lockport, as soon as he can obtain something
like a fair price for it; and I hereby empower my executor to sell
all my property, personal and real, except the farm on which I
live, on showing to the court a necessity therefor, and giving security; but he shall first sell the personal property, and collect
debts due me, then sell the mill property at Lockport, then the
town property at Delphi, then at West Delphi, then at Pittsburg
and Greencastle.
"3. The balance of my property, after paying debts, shall be
disposed of as follows, both real and personal, (except the portion
which the law gives to my beloved wife,) viz., it shall be divided
equally between my three children, Hiram Allen, Jr., (whom I
shall descend to and be vested in his illegitimate child or children who are residents
of this State or any other of the United States, and such illegitimate children shall
be deemed and taken to be the heir or heirs of such intestate, in the same manner,
and entitled to take by distribution to the same effect and extent as if such child
or children had been legitimate: .Provided, That such intestate shall have acknowledged such child or children, during his life-time, as his own."
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have educated and recognized as my own son, and do hereby acknowlege to be my son,) and William Allen and Kate Allen, my two
adopted children, whom I hereby acknowledge and recognize as my
children.
"I hereby appoint my beloved wife, Margaret M. Allen, the
guardian of the persons and property of my two children, William
Allen and Kate Allen; and I hereby appoint my said son, Hiram
Allen, Jr., my executor. I further direct that in the final adjustment of the property between my three children, my son Hiram shall
be charged with the sum of $1,000 already advanced to him, unless,
before my death, I should equally advance my other two children.
"4. I further direct that on the death of either of my above
children, without children living, the share of such child shall go
to the survivors or survivor."
The widow, Margaret M. Allen, elected to take under the law,
if any provision was made for her by the will.
In 1860 she intermarried with William A. Barns, with whom
she now joins inan application for the partition of the real estate of
her former husband, Hiram Allen, deceased, claiming one-third
thekeof in fee. By the answers of the defendants, admitted by
demurrers to be true, it appears that Hiram Allen, deceased, in
his life-time, had caused to be conveyed to his wife Margaret, the
now female plaintiff, as an intended advancement or jointure, real
estate of the value of 5,000 dollars, which she enjoys as her property; and it is claimed that this real estate should be treated as
an advancement, or as a jointure. It further appears that the
estate of said Hiram, deceased, is indebted in the sum of $85,000,
upon judgments, mortgages, and simple contracts. It is claimed
that the widow must contribute to the payment of these debts.
It has already appeared in our statement that William and
Kate, two of the devisees, were adopted children of Hiram Allen,
the devisor. It has also appeared that .Margaret, the female
plaintiff, now claiming one-third of Allen's lands in fee, was his
third wife, was childless, and has, since his death, married a second
husband. Our law of descents provides that "if a widow shall
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marry a second or any subsequent time, holding real estate in -virtue of any previous marriage, such widow may not, during such
marriage, with or without the assent of her husband, alienate such
real estate; and if during such marriage, such widow shall die,
such real estate shall go to her children by the marriage in virtue
of which such real estate came to her, if any there be : 1 R. S.,
p. 250, sec. 18.
And further, " that if a man marry a second or other subsequent
wife, and has by her no children, but has children alive by a previous wife, the land which at his death descends to such wife, shall
at her death descend to his children." Id. p. 251, sec. 24.
Now, Allen, the former husband of the female plaintiff, left no
child or children begotten upon the body of a former wife; and if
he had left no adopted children, it would be clear that the share of
the female plaintiff in his real estate would vest in absolute fee.
Does the existence of the adopted children place the right of inheritence of the wife within the statute above quoted ?
Our statute of adoption enacts that any person may adopt, and
that the adopted child shall "be entitled to and receive all the
rights and interest in the estate of such adopted father or mother,
by descent or otherwise, that such child would do if the natural
heir of such adopted father or mother." Acts 1855, p. 122.
It is competent for the legislature to increase or diminish the
inchoate interest of the wife in the estate of her husband, or of an
heir apparent in the estate of the ancestor: Noel vs. Ewing, 9
Ind. 37.
The female plaintiff, therefore, cannot legally complain should it
turn out that the adoption of children by Allen, her husband, resulted in the diminution of her inheritance. Is such the fact?
The statute declares that adopted shall have all the rights of
"natural" children. In what sense is the word "natural" here
used? We think in the sense of legitimate, and for these reasons:
1. It would be undignified in a legislature to provide for the
adoption of children into the condition of bastardy.
2. The word "natural" is nowhere used in our statutes to designate
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illegitimate children; but the words bastard and illegitimate are
employed for that purpose.
8. The word is used in a statute providing an artificial mode of
creating heirs, and is designed to contrast in the mind, the legal,
natural mode of creating them with the artificial.
4. Adoption of heirs is not of common law origin. It was practiced among most of the ancient nations, and we have borrowed it
from the civil law. In that law it gave the right of inheritance of
a natural heir, which meant a legitimate heir. Bouvier, in his dictionary, tit. "Natural Children," says, "in the language of the
civil law, natural are distinguished from adopted children, that is,
they are the children of the parents spoken of, by natural procreation. See Inst. lib. 8, tit. 1, sec. 2." See as to the practice
among the Jews, the Bible. See as to adoption in the civil law, 3
Grote's Greece, p. 189, note.- Adams' lom.Antiq. tit. Adoption.
Bouvier Die. h. t.
And it may be observed that the time of adoption will, under our
law, affect the interest of adopted children in the estate of the
adopted parents. If they be adopted at a time when the adopted
father has no wife, and he marry afterwards, they may stand as
children of a former wife ; otherwise as to a wife existing at the
time of adoption; so it may be further observed that by the common law, statute, not nature, designates heirs, though statutes may
seek to follow nature. Blackst6ne, book 2, p. 201, says: "An
heir, therefore, is he upon whom the law casts the estate immedidiately on the death of the ancestor. Our conclusion then, is, that
the adopted children in this case have all the rights in the estate of
their adopted father that would have belonged to them had they
been children begotten upon the body of his wife, that is to say,
the woman who was his wife at the time of the adoption of the
children. As the adopted children of the husband, they would not
be heirs of the separate property of the wife, but they would be of
the property of the husband. Had they been adopted as the
children of the wife, by her alone, they might have inherited her
separate property (that is if a wife could adopt) not that of her husband. Perhaps, if they had been jointly adopted by both husband
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and wife, they might have inherited the separate property of
each.
It follows, from what has been said, that as the children took,
under the will, all that might have been inherited, and the female
plaintiff took only what fell to her under the law, her right must
be determined by the statute above quoted.
What the extent of the statute may be, in different contingencies,
it is not necessary now to determine. Is it an absolute fee till the
subsequent marriage, then a life estate during the continuance of
such marriage, then an absolute fee again after the death of the
husband of such marriage, the wife surviving? Was this the intention of the Legislature? Ought such to be the law? See Blackleach vs. Harvey, 14 Ind., 564.
We next inquire whether Allen's widow is bound to account, in
the adjustment of the estate, for the $5,000 worth of property received from her husband in his life-time.
That property does not constitute a provision by will in bar of
dower, for the will says nothing about it. It is an advancement;
but is it such an advancement as is required to be bronght into
hotchpot?
If so, it is because the common law or our own statute makes it
such.
It is not such by the common law. Blackstone says, Book 2, p.
189: "No lands but such as are given in frank marriage hall be
brought into hotchpot ;" but lands given in frank marriage "are
defined to be, where tenements are given by one man, together with
a wife who is the daughter or cousin of the donor, to hold in frank
marriage." Id. 115.
The lands in the case at bar are not such.
Our statute does not distinguish lands that must be brought into
hotchpot by this origin of title; but it does, as does the common
law, confine this obligation within limits as to persons. By the
common law, it exists only between female heirs, they only taking
the estate in common by descent. Here it exists between heirs
regardless of sex. Our statute has abolished dower, the estate
taken by the wife, at common law, not as heir, but as wife, and
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substituted a fee simple, which the wife takes by descent as heir of
her hipsband, and independent of his power to prevent it ; but it
has not, in terms, required her to bring advancements into hotchpot.
It thus subjects children only to this liability. This may be a legislative oversight, but such is the statute. It enacts that "advancements in real or personal property shall be charged against the
child or descendants of the child to whom the advancement is
made ;" but goes no further. Perhaps the Supreme Court, governed
by the reason rather than by the letter of the law, should place the
widow on the footing of a child in this behalf; but, sitting at nisi
prius, the writer does not feel disposed to thus rule now. 1 R. S.
p. 250, sec. 12. See as to the estate being cast by the law upon
the wife by descent, which, as we have seen above, fills the definition of the term "heir ;" sees. 17, 22, and following pp. 250, 251,
1R.S.
See, as to advancements, that is, gifts to a wife, instead of estates
in trust, as against the person making them and creditors, but not
necessarily to be brought into hotchpot. Matthews on Presumptive
Evidence, p. 55, et seq., ed. of 1830; 2 Story Eq. p. 612, et seq.
May the conveyance of the property in question to the wife be
shown by parol to be a provision for her in the nature of jointure?
Our statute provides for two descriptions of jointure.
1. Pecuniary provisions made for and with the consent of an
intended wife or husband. In this class, the consent of the intended
wife or husband must appear in writing. 1 R. S. p. 254, sec. 87.
2. Those made for the wife before coverture, without her assent,
and those made after coverture. Id. sec. 40.
In this class, there must be an election to take, by the wife,
within a year after the death of her husband, which election might
probably be evidenced by her declarations, and possession and
enjoyment of the provision, after the expiration of the year mentioned, made for her as a jointure: Washburn on Real Property,
vol. 1, p. 273, as the statute does not express how it shall be
shown. And, it may be observed, if the provision is held a jointure,
it is a bar to any and all inheritance; if an advancement, it is, if
less than a full share, a bar, pro-tanto only. I R. S. p. 250.
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In this class, we think, also, the fact that the provision was
intended by the husband as in the nature of a jointure, may be
shown by parol. The statute does not say, as in case of a will,
and of a jointure with consent at the time, that it must appear by
the writing.
It has been held that in contracts within the statute of frauds,
consideration may be shown by parol. Gregory vs. Logan, 7
Blackf. 112. See Boclchill vs. Spraggs, 9 Ind. 30. So, as to
whether a given conveyance was intended to be by way of advancement. Shaw vs. Kent, 11 Ind. 80.
The case at bar falls within the class under consideration.
On the last point, viz: whether the widow, in case she establishes
her right to a portion of the inheritance of which Allen died seized,
must contribute to payment of incumbrances, no decision will now
be made, as the question does not necessarily arise in the partition
suit. We may observe, that at common law, she would have been
bound to contribute to discharge the liens. Whitehead vs. Cummins,
2 Ind. 58. Whether our statute has made a change, is the question.
The demurrer to the second paragraph of the answer of the defendants is overruled on the defendant's striking out the words pro-tanto
therein, and so is that to the second paragraph of the answer of
William and Kate Allen; and those to the others are sustained.
Schermehorn, Huff, and Jones, for plaintiffs.
Prattand Baldwin, for defendants.
In the Supreme Court of Michigan.-July Term, 1861.
ALPHEUS G. SMITH AND OTHERS vs. ISAAC c. KENDALL.
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An instrument by which the makers promise to pay, to the order of the payees,
at a time and place named, a specific sum of money, with current exchange on Nlew
York, is a negotiable promissory note.-CAx sBr, J., dissenting.

Error to Kent Circuit. The principal question in the case was,
whether Kendall, the plaintiff (below), as endorsee of the following
instrument, was entitled to treat it as a promissory note, and bring
suit thereon in his own name:

I We are indebted to T. M. Cerley, Esq., the learned State Reporter, for the
sheets of this case.-Ens. Am. L. REG.

SMITH AND OTHERS vs. KENDALL.
Naw Yonz, July 13, 1858.
"$793 98.
Eight months after date we, the subscribers, of Grand Rapids, County of Kent,
and State of Michigan, promise to pay to the order of Eli Bowen and McConnell,
seven hundred and ninety-three dollars and ninety-eight cents, at the banking
house of Duncan, Sherman & Co. Value received, with current exchange on New
SMITH & McCONNELL.
York.

J. T. HoZmes, for plaintiffs in error.
Witlhey and Gray, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The instrument, it is argued, is not a promissory
MANNING, J.
note, because it is payable with current exchange on New York.
It is for $793 98 if paid in the city of New.York; if paid elsewhere, it calls for that amount, with such additional sum, called
exchange, as will make the amount where paid equivalent to $793 98
in the city of New York.
A promissory note must be for the payment of a certain sum of
money. Exchange varies from time to time, and might have been
more or less when the $793 98 were to be paid than when the instrument was given. Is this fluctuation, to which exchange is subject, such a contingency or uncertainty as the rule requiring a note
to be for a sum certain was intended to guard against ? We think
not. Bills of exchange and promissory notes are commercial instruments, and to facilitate commerce, are subject to certain rules of
law not applicable to other contracts. These rules should be liberally construed, and in such a way as to effect the object had in view.
Exchange is an incident to bills for the transmission of money from
one place to another. Its nature and effect are well understood in
the commercial world; and merchants having occasion to use their
funds at their place of business, sometimes make their currency at
that point the standard of payments made to them by their customers at a different point. Such is the design of the instrument
before us; and we believe that such instruments are considered by
commercial men to be promissory notes. In Pollardvs. Herries,
3 Bos. & Pul., 385, P deposited a certain sum of money with H,
in Paris, and took H's note, "payable in Paris, or, at the choice of
the bearer, at the Union Bank, in Dover, or at H's usual residence
in London, according to the course of exchange upon Paris." This
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instrument was declared on as a promissory note, and spoken of and
treated by both counsel and court as a promissory note. It is
called a promissory note by the Reporter, and treated as such by
M. Chitty in his Treatise on Bills of Exchange, pp. 232, 424. In
Leggett vs. Jones, 10 Wis. 84, a written promise to pay a sum of
money "with exchange on New York" was held to be a promissory
note.
The judgment cannot be affirmed.
MARTIN,

Ch. J., concurred.

CHRISTIANCY, J.-I
concur in the opinion of my brother Manning. So far as relates to the question of exchange, I think this
note should be considered as resting upon substantially the same
principle as if made payable in New York without exchange.

CAMPBELL, J. dissenting: I do not think that a negotiable promissory note can be made except for a sum certain. This is an old
and familiar doctrine, which is laid down by the best authorities
-without qualification. And while it is undoubtedly true that railroad bonds and some other securities of like character, made by
corporations, have been negotiable, yet there is no real difference
between these and ordinary negotiable paper, except in their being
under a corporation seal, which is merely the most appropriate
evidence of corporate action. The requisites of certainty, both as
to time and mode of payment, have always been regarded as substantial, and as the most essential elements of paper made for circulation and payable to the holder. And although a quasi negotiability has been asserted of bills of lading, and some documents of
like character, yet complete negotiability has never been extended
beyond such paper as has, since the Statute of Anne, possessed that
quality by commercial law. And it does not seem to be in harmony with any principle of law to break down the settled rules
which have given value and currency to such securities. If negotiability only meant the liability to be sued in the name of a bearer
or endorsee, it would be of little consequence. But when paper is
made negotiable. it passes from one to another, discharged from all
equities until its maturity. The parties who make, or accept, or
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endorse it, become subject to peculiar liabilities. And I do not
think anything short of a clear legislative authority should be permitted to affix such burdens or privileges to any new class of contracts.
In the case of Pollard vs. Herrim, 3 Bos. &Pul. 335, the action
being between the immediate parties to the note, no question arose
concerning its negotiable character ; and there is no English case,
that I am aware of, which has given any countenance to innovation
on this subject. So far as any practice has existed in this State,
in relation to notes payable with exchange, I believe it has not been
in favor of their negotiability. The question has been raised
several times in the Federal Court within my own experience, and
every case I have known has held them not to possess that character. And I doubt exceedingly whether the general opinion of commercial men is by any means settled in their favor.
There is no reason why one kind of uncertainty should be more
favored than another. It is very well settled by most courts that a
note payable in current bank bills is not negotiable. And yet the
principle objections to allowing bank bills for this purpose apply to
exchange. They both fluctuate in value, under very similar conditions. The difference of exchange between the two places has no
direct connection with the expense of transporting money. It is as
cheap to take money from New York to London, as from London to
New York, and yet there is a difference of about ten per cent. in
favor of London almost always. There are, however, no means of
calculating'the rate in advance, and fluctuations of several per cent.
occur within a few weeks. Nor can the promise, contained in the
note before us, be regarded as equivalent to an agreement to pay
what will make a uniform sum in New York. This can only be on
the assumption that the balance of exchange will always be one
way, whereas it is very well known that there is no such certainty.
And this note would not be satisfied by a payment of less than the
sum mentioned in it, although it might be worth much more than
the same amount in New York. It is very true that New York is
likely to have a balance against us; but the principle adopted, if
true at all, must apply to all places.
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It may be that public convenience would be subserved by
changing the existing rules. But to hold this paper negotiable,
would, I think, be not an application of a common law principle to
a new subject, but the abrogation of a principle entirely. This
would come more appropriately from another department of the
government. I regret that I have not been able to satisfy myself
with the conclusion of the court upon this question, which is certainly one of general interest.

